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Abstract
We provide a formal definition of blameworthiness in set-
tings where multiple agents can collaborate to avoid a nega-
tive outcome. We first provide a method for ascribing blame-
worthiness to groups relative to an epistemic state (a distribu-
tion over causal models that describe how the outcome might
arise). We then show how we can go from an ascription of
blameworthiness for groups to an ascription of blamewor-
thiness for individuals using a standard notion from cooper-
ative game theory, the Shapley value. We believe that get-
ting a good notion of blameworthiness in a group setting will
be critical for designing autonomous agents that behave in a
moral manner.
1 Introduction
As we move towards an era where autonomous systems are
ubiquitous, being able to reason formally about moral re-
sponsibility will become more and more critical. Such rea-
soning will be necessary not only for legal ascription of re-
sponsibility, but also in order to design systems that behave
in a moral manner in the first place. Unfortunately, though,
pinning down the many notions related to moral responsibil-
ity has been notoriously difficult to do, even informally. In
this work, we lay foundations on which these problems can
be solved.
Halpern and Kleiman-Weiner (2018) (HK from now on)
made important headway on this work by providing a defi-
nition of blameworthiness based on a causal framework. An
epistemic state, that is, a distribution over causal models, can
be used to capture an agent’s beliefs about the effects that ac-
tions may have. Given an epistemic state, they then provide
a definition of blameworthiness for an outcome by taking
into account both whether the agent believed they could af-
fect the likelihood of the outcome and the cost they believed
would be necessary to do so.
While their definition seems compelling in single-agent
settings, as HK themselves observe, the definition does not
capture blameworthiness in multi-agent settings where, if
the group could coordinate their actions, they could easily
bring about a different outcome (see Section 3.2 for more
discussion of this issue). Being able to analyze blamewor-
thiness in multi-agent scenarios seems critical in practice; if
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an accident is brought about due to the actions of multiple
agents, we would like to understand to what extent each one
is blameworthy.
We tackle that problem here by defining a notion of group
blameworthiness in multi-agent scenarios. Our notion can
be viewed as a generalization of the single-agent notion of
blameworthiness defined by HK. However, as we shall see,
subtleties arise when considering groups. Once we have a
way of ascribing blameworthiness to a group, we show that
a standard notion from cooperative game theory, the Shap-
ley value (Shapley 1953), can be used to apportion blame to
individual members of the group, and is in fact the only way
to do so that satisfies a number of desirable properties.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2
we review the basic causal framework used. Section 3 con-
stitutes the core of the work; in it, we review the Halpern and
Kleiman-Weiner definition of blameworthiness in the single-
agent setting, define group blameworthiness, show how to
apportion it to individual agents, and demonstrate how the
definition plays out in an illustrative example. In Section 4
we review related work and in Section 5 we conclude.
2 Causal Models
At the heart of our definitions is the causal model framework
of Halpern and Pearl (2005). We briefly review the relevant
material here.
A causal situation is characterized by a set of variables
and their values. A set of structural equations describes
the effects that the different variables have on each other.
Among the variables we distinguish between exogenous
variables (those variables whose values are determined by
factors not modeled) and endogenous variables (those vari-
ables whose values are determined by factors in the model).
A causal modelM = (S,F) consists of a signature S and
a setF of structural equations. A signature S = (U ,V ,R) is
in turn composed of a (finite but nonempty) set U of exoge-
nous variables, a (finite but nonempty) set V of endogenous
variables, and a range functionR that maps each variable in
U∪V to a set of values it can take on.F associates with each
endogenous variable X ∈ V a function denoted FX such
that FX : (×U∈UR(U)) × (×Y ∈V−{X}R(Y )) → R(X);
that is, FX determines the value of X , given the values of
all the other variables in U ∪ V .
We assume that there is a special subset A of the endoge-
nous variables known as the action variables. Since we con-
sider scenarios with multiple agents, we need to be able to
identify which agent each action is associated with. Thus,
given a set G of agents, we augment the signature of the
causal model to be S = (U ,V ,R,G), where G : A → G as-
sociates an agent with each action variable in A. The range
of a variable A ∈ A is simply the set of actions available to
the agent G(A). So, for instance, if there are five members of
a committee and each of them can vote yes or no then there
will be action variables A1 through A5 with G(Ai) = i and
R(Ai) = {yes,no} for all i. We restrict here to scenarios
where there is one action per agent; in future work, we hope
to consider blameworthiness in planning scenarios, where
agents may take multiple actions sequentially.
In causal models, we can reason about interventions.
Specifically, we have formulas of the form [A← a]ϕ, which
can be read “if action a were performed, then the outcome
would be ϕ”, where an outcome is a Boolean combination
of primitive events of the form X = x. We give seman-
tics to such formulas in a causal setting (M,~u) consisting
of a causal modelM and a context ~u, an assignment of val-
ues to all the exogenous variables. We do not need the de-
tails of the semantics in what follows; they can be found in
(Halpern 2016; Halpern and Pearl 2005).
3 Blameworthiness
With this background, we now turn to the question of how
blameworthy an agent ag is for an outcome ϕ. We begin
by reviewing the HK definition, and then propose a way of
dealing with settings that allow coordinated group actions.
One caveat: as noted by HK, words like “blame” have a wide
variety of nuanced meanings in natural language. While we
think that the notion that we are trying to capture (which is
essentially the same as the notion that HK tried to capture) is
useful, it corresponds at best to only one way that the word
“blame” is used by people.
3.1 Blameworthiness in a single-agent setting
HK identified two factors that play a role in determining
blameworthiness: ag’s beliefs about his ability to affect ϕ
and ag’s beliefs about the cost necessary to affect ϕ. Here
we present a slightly simplified version of their formaliza-
tion of these notions.
An agent ag has an epistemic state E = (Pr,K) rela-
tive to which his or her blameworthiness is determined. K
is the set of all causal settings that ag considers possible,
and Pr is a probability on K.1 Given E = (Pr,K), two
actions a and a′, and an outcome ϕ, we can define δEa,a′,ϕ
to be how much more likely ϕ was to occur if the agent
performed action a than if he performed a′. Let [[ψ]]K de-
note the set of all settings in K where ψ is true, so that
Pr([[[A = a]ϕ]]K) is the probability that ag ascribes to
outcome ϕ occurring given that action a is taken. Then
δEa,a′,ϕ = max(0, P r([[[A = a]ϕ]]K)− Pr([[[A = a
′]ϕ]]K)).
1In HK’s original formalization, an epistemic state also con-
tained a utility function. This is not necessary for our purposes, so
to simplify matters we leave it out.
Thus, δEa,a′,ϕ is 0 if performing action a
′ is at least as likely
to result in outcome ϕ as performing action a.
Intuitively, this δEa,a′,ϕ term ought to play a significant role
in how we define blameworthiness: if ag does not believe
that he can have any effect on outcomeϕ, then we can hardly
blame him for its occurrence. At the same time, though, this
does not seem to tell the whole story. For if ag believed he
could change the outcome but only by giving up his life, we
would not blame him for ϕ’s occurence. Thus there seems
to be a second factor at play, the expected cost c(a) that ag
ascribes to each action a. Intuitively, the cost measures such
factors as the cognitive effort, the time required to perform
the action, the emotional cost of the action, and the potential
negative consequences of performing the action (like death).
(HK provide further discussion and intuition for cost.)
Noting that the balance between these two terms seems to
be situation-dependent, HK propose that a parameter N >
maxa′ c(a
′) be used to weight the cost term in a given sce-
nario. The degree of blameworthiness of ag for ϕ relative to
action a′, given that ag took action a, is then defined to be
dbcN (a, a
′, E , ϕ) = δEa,a′,ϕ
N−max(c(a′)−c(a),0)
N
. The degree
of blameworthiness of ag for ϕ given that ag took action a
is then dbcN (a, E , ϕ) = maxa′ db
c
N(a, a
′, E , ϕ).
As pointed out by HK, blameworthiness judgments are
not always made relative to the beliefs of the agent. It may be
more appropriate to consider the beliefs that we believe that
the agent ought to have had. Consider, for example, a drunk
driver who gets into an accident; in his inebriated state, he
may have believed that it was perfectly safe to drive, but we
still consider him blameworthy because we do not consider
that belief acceptable. The definition just takes an epistemic
state as input, without worrying about whose epistemic state
it is.
3.2 Blameworthiness of groups
As HK already note, this definition of blameworthiness
seems to provide unsatisfactory results in settings where
multiple agents are involved. Consider for instance the well-
known Tragedy of the Commons (Hardin 1968).
Example 3.1. 100 fishermen live by a lake. If at least 10
of them overfish this year then the entire fish population of
the lake will die out and there will be nothing left to fish in
coming years. Each fisherman, however, believes that it is
very likely that at least 10 other fishermen will overfish. So
given that all the fish will die out no matter his particular
action, each fisherman decides to maximize his utility that
year and so overfishes. By the end of the year the entire fish
population has died out.
Under the definition of blameworthiness discussed, each
fisherman will have blameworthiness close to 0, as δEa,a′,ϕ
will be close to 0: each fisherman deemed the probability of
the fish population dying to be close to 1 independent of his
or her own action. And it seems unreasonable to say their
beliefs were unacceptable, as in fact what each fisherman
predicted is exactly what occurred. But it seems problem-
atic for each fisherman to have a degree of blameworthiness
that is almost 0 when the fishermen as a group are clearly to
blame for this outcome. ⊓⊔
How blameworthy are the fishermen for the outcome?We
claim that in order to assign blame to the group, we need
to assess the cost to the fishermen of coordinating their ac-
tions, just as was done with actions in the case of assigning
individual blameworthiness. If in fact it was impossible or
extremely difficult for the fisherman to coordinate (perhaps
they had no means of communication, or all spoke different
languages), then they each should have very little blamewor-
thiness. On the other hand, if coordination would have been
relatively straightforward, then the group should be viewed
as quite blameworthy.
Computing the costs and expected effects of different
ways that the group could coordinate seems, in general,
quite difficult. To do this, we would need to have a model
of what kinds of actions the group could perform in order
to bring about coordination. Perhaps some members of the
group could convince politicians to pass laws that put caps
on how large the catch could be; perhaps they could arrange
for sensors that would be able to monitor how much each
individual fisherman caught. Note that in this discussion we
are not considering whether fishermen would want to under-
take these actions; only whether there are feasible actions
that might lead to coordination, and how much they would
cost. For example, the fishermen might choose not to lobby
politicians to pass laws because doing so would be quite ex-
pensive, but if it was possible for them to do so, we still
consider it an action the group could have taken. Unfortu-
nately, while we may understand how concrete actions might
affect the likelihood of the fish population dying out, com-
pletely describing a set of rich causal models that capture
the possible dynamics that can lead to collaboration may be
prohibitively difficult, if not impossible.
We instead consider a simpler way to capture difficulty
of coordination in group settings by abstracting away from
these details. We directly associate a cost with various dis-
tributions over causal settings (i.e., epistemic states) that we
view as the possible outcomes of attempts to coordinate. In-
tuitively, these are the distributions that could have been in-
duced by feasible collective actions given beliefs about the
probability of different causal settings in the richer mod-
els. The cost of a distribution represents the expected cost
of performing whatever collective actions were needed in
the richer models to bring about that distribution, as well as
the expected costs of whatever actions will be taken in the
simpler model. For example, suppose that the richer causal
model for the tragedy of the commons example allowed for
installing sensors, and after installing sensors we believe
each fisherman i will have an independent probability pi of
overfishing. This leads to a distribution over the settings of
the simple causal models that were implicit in the descrip-
tion of Example 3.1, where there is presumably an exoge-
nous variable Ui that determines how much fishing fisher-
man i does. This exogenous variable is endogenous in the
richer model, and is affected by the installation of sensors.
In any case, the cost of that distribution on causal settings in
the simpler model is the cost of performing whatever collec-
tive actions are required in the richer model to arrange for
the installation of sensors, plus the expected collective costs
of all the fishing the fishermen do. Note that there may not be
feasible collective actions (i.e., ones with finite cost) in the
richer model that lead to none of the fishermen overfishing.
It is also worth noting that modeling the effects of an at-
tempt at coordination in the richer models as a distribution
over causal settings in the simpler models allows us to cap-
ture other effects that the coordination process may have.
For instance, consider a scenario where one of the fishermen
believes that taking everyone out on a boat ride on the lake
would be a particularly effective way to get the fishermen
to feel social responsibility to not overfish. Such a boat ride
may also effect the pollution levels in the lake, which in turn
may also play a role in determining whether the fish popula-
tion will die out. By viewing the coordination process as in-
ducing a new distribution over causal settings, we can at the
same time capture both effects that the boat ride is expected
to have on how people behave and on pollution levels.
With this background, we can now give analogues to the
HK definitions. We first give an analogue to the definition of
δEa,a′,ϕ. As discussed above, rather than comparing two ac-
tions that an individual can perform, we are comparing two
epistemic states (intuitively, ones brought about by different
collective actions in the richer model). Let Ei = (Pri,Ki),
i = 1, 2, be two epistemic states. Then, given an outcome ϕ,
we can define the extent to which ϕ was more likely given
E1 than E2 as
δE1,E2,ϕ = max(0,Pr1([[ϕ]]K1 )− Pr2([[ϕ]]K2)).
Just as in the HK definition, we are comparing the likelihood
of outcome ϕ in two scenarios. For HK, the two scenarios
were determined by the agent performing two different ac-
tions; here, they are determined by two different epistemic
states that we can think of as arising from two coordination
actions in the richer models combined with uncertainty re-
garding the richer causal setting.
We now want to get an analogue of the degree of blame-
worthiness function db for a group. Again, this will depend
on two parameters, a cost function c and a parameterN that
determines the relative weight we ascribe to the cost and
the difference δ defined above. However, now c has differ-
ent arguments. One of its arguments is, as suggested above,
an epistemic state. The second is a subset of agents. Let
Ag = {ag1, . . . , agM} be the set of all agents and consider a
subsetAg ′ ⊆ Ag . We think of c(Ag ′, E) as the expected cost
of the coordination actions in the richer game required for
the agents in Ag ′ to bring about epistemic state E , plus the
expected total costs of the actions of the agents in the sim-
pler models given that epistemic state (see below).2 The key
point here is that we may not require coordination among all
the agents to bring about a particular epistemic state; it may
only require a subset. Moreover different subsets of agents
may have different costs for obtaining the same outcome;
the cost function is intended to capture that.
The cost function is meant to take into account not only
the costs of bringing about E , but the expected cost of per-
forming action Ai for i ∈ Ag
′ in the simpler causal models.
2If there is more than one way for the agents in Ag ′ to bring
about E , we can think of c(Ag ′, E) as being the cost of the cheapest
way to do so.
This cost may vary from one causal model to another (e.g.,
it may be more costly to overfish if the probability of getting
caught is higher, and this may depend on the causal model).
Given an epistemic state, we can compute the expected costs
of performingAi.
Given a cost function c and “balance parameter” N , de-
fine the degree of blameworthiness for outcome ϕ of group
Ag ′ and epistemic state E1 = (Pr1,K1) relative to epistemic
state E2 = (Pr2,K2) such that c(Ag
′, E2) is finite as
gbcN (Ag
′, E1, E2, ϕ)
= δE1,E2,ϕ
N−max(c(Ag′,E2)−c(Ag
′,E1),0)
N
.
Althoughwe replace actions a1 and a2 in the definition of db
by epistemic states E1 and E2, and use a cost function with
different arguments, the intuition for both the group degree
of blameworthiness function gb and the individual degree of
blameworthiness function db defined by HK are very much
the same.
Just as for individual degree of blameworthiness, we can
define the group blameworthiness of groupAg ′ for outcome
ϕ given epistemic state E1 as the max over all possible
choices of E2.
gbcN (Ag
′, E1, ϕ)
= max{E2:c(Ag′,E2) is finite} gb
c
N(Ag
′, E1, E2, ϕ).
Note that the degree of group blameworthiness of the
empty group or any other group that cannot coordinate any
alternative actions will be 0; the only epistemic state E2 such
that c(Ag ′, E2) is finite will be E1 itself, and δE1,E1,ϕ is 0.
One thing worth mentioning is that we require a mono-
tonicity property for group blame: if Ag ′′ ⊆ Ag ′ ⊆ Ag then
gbcN(Ag
′′, E , ϕ) ≤ gbcN(Ag
′, E , ϕ). The reason for this is
that if group Ag ′′ could coordinate in a particular way for a
particular cost then that subset of groupAg ′ could do exactly
the same thing. Essentially, when considering the possibility
of a group coordinating, we must really consider the possi-
bility of coordination of any subset of that group.
Up to now, we have not said anything about whose epis-
temic state we should use for the epistemic states E1 and
E2 in the definitions above. In the case of individual blame-
worthiness, the typical assumption is that they represent the
epistemic state of the agent whose blameworthiness is be-
ing considered, although as HK already observed, it may at
times be reasonable to assume that it is the epistemic state
that society thinks that agent should have. Here we are talk-
ing about group blameworthiness, so it is less clear whose
epistemic state should be used. It is certainly not clear what
a “group epistemic state” should be. It still makes sense
to think about “society’s epistemic state”; that is, society’s
view of what a reasonable agent’s beliefs should be. We can
also take the epistemic state to be the subjective beliefs of
one of the agents. Indeed, we will often consider the epis-
temic state of an agent in the group. We could also view
the cost function as subjective—again, it could be society’s
cost function or the cost function from the perspective of a
particular agent. The definition is agnostic as to where the
epistemic state and cost function are coming from, but to
apply the definition we need to be explicit.
It is now worth returning briefly to Example 3.1, to see
how this definition plays out there. Given an epistemic state
Ei = (Pri,Ki) and cost function ci representing the be-
liefs of agent ag i, first consider a scenario where it would
be essentially impossible for the fishermen to coordinate
(e.g., no two fishermen speak the same language). If ag i
believed this, then the cost of coordinating any possible al-
ternative distribution would likely be very high, so the term
N−max(ci(Ag
′,E2)−ci(Ag
′,E1),0)
N
would be close to 0. Because
this is true for all epistemic states E2, maximizing over E2
would still give that gbciN (Ag
′, Ei, ϕ) is close to 0. On the
other hand, suppose that ag i believed that there was some
possible coordination of group Ag ′ that was not tremen-
dously expensive and that could lead to an epistemic state
E2 relative to which the probability of the fish population
dying was lower (e.g., imposing a fine on anyone who over-
fished). In this case, to the extent that E2 was believed to be
effective and low cost, the group Ag ′ of fishermen would in
fact be quite blameworthy. Note that Ag ′ might not consist
of all the fisherman; it is possible that a subset of fishermen
is powerful enough to impose fines. In general, different sub-
groups will have different degrees of blameworthiness.
3.3 Apportioning group blameworthiness among
agents
Now that we have defined group blameworthiness, the ques-
tion naturally arises: how should group blameworthiness be
apportioned among the members of the group? In this sub-
section, we suggest three axioms that we believe apportion-
ment of blame should satisfy. It turns out that these axioms
are natural analogues of axioms that have been used to char-
acterize the Shapley value. Shapley (1953) introduced the
Shapley value as an approach to distributing benefits to in-
dividual agents in scenarios where agents might coordinate
to obtain greater total benefits than they could individually.
The Shapley value has since also been interpreted as way
of appropriately distributing costs for shared resources (see
e.g. (Roth and Verrecchia 1979)). It is thus not surprising
that it can be applied in our setting as a way of apportioning
group blame.
Given a cost function c and balance parameter N , let
db
c,E
N (j, ϕ) be the degree of blameworthiness ascribed to
agj for outcome ϕ relative to epistemic state E . Consider
the following three axioms for db
c,E
N (j, ϕ):
Efficiency. All of the blame assigned to the full group of
agents must be apportioned to the agents in the group:∑
j
db
c,E
N (j, ϕ) = gb
c
N(Ag, E , ϕ).
This axiom essentially encapsulates what we are trying
to do: apportion the total group blame among individ-
uals. Note that we do not want an analogue of this for
subgroups Ag ′ of Ag . For example, if a small subgroup
Ag ′ of fishermen cannot coordinate so as to affect the out-
come, they would have quite a low degree of blamewor-
thiness, although the group consisting of all the fishermen
might have degree of blameworthiness 1. Thus, we do not
necessarily want the sum of the degrees of blameworthi-
ness of the individual fishermen in Ag ′ to be the group
blameworthiness of Ag ′.
Symmetry. The names of agents should not affect their
blameworthiness, so if we simply rename them then
the blameworthiness ascribed to them should remain the
same. Formally, let π be a permutation of {1, . . . ,M}.
Given a model M = ((U ,V ,R,G),F), let π ◦ M =
((U ,V ,R,G′),F), where G′(A) = π(G(A)) for all ac-
tion variables A ∈ A. Given a set K of causal set-
tings, define π ◦ K = {(π ◦ M,~u) : (M,~u) ∈ K}.
That is to say, for any action that is assigned to agent
i in any model, we now instead assign it to agent π(i).
Given a distributionPr over causal settings (M,~u), define
(π ◦Pr)((π ◦M,~u)) = Pr((M,~u)); if a setting had a par-
ticular probability then we want the corresponding setting
with the actions renamed according to π to have the same
probability. Finally, given an epistemic state E = (Pr,K),
let π ◦ E = (π ◦Pr, π ◦K). The symmetry axiom requires
that
db
c,E
N (i, ϕ) = db
pi◦c,pi◦E
N (π(i), ϕ),
where (π ◦ c)(Ag ′, E) = c({b′ : π(b′) ∈ Ag ′}, π−1 ◦
E) (i.e., costs in the new models correspond to costs pre-
renaming, which we get by taking the π-preimage).
Strong Monotonicity. If agent agj contributes more to the
group blameworthiness of all groups in one scenario than
another, then agj also ought to have a greater degree of
(personal) blameworthiness in the first scenario. Formally,
define the marginal contribution of agj to the degree of
blameworthiness of group Ag ′ as
mb
c,E
N (j,Ag
′, ϕ) ={
gbcN (Ag
′, E , ϕ)− gbcN (Ag
′\agj , E , ϕ) if agj ∈Ag
′
gbcN (Ag
′∪agj , E , ϕ)−gb
c
N (Ag
′, E , ϕ) if agj /∈Ag
′.
Let mb
c,E
N and mb
′c,E
N be the marginal contributions to
the degree of blameworthiness for two different scenarios;
let db
c,E
N and db
′c,E
N be the associated degree of (personal)
blameworthiness for the two scenarios. Then we require
that if
mb
c,E
N (j,Ag
′, ϕ) ≥ mb′c,EN (j,Ag
′, ϕ) for all Ag ′ ⊆ Ag
then
db
c,E
N (j, ϕ) ≥ db
′c,E
N (j, ϕ).
Young (1985) showed that the only distribution procedure
that would satisfy Efficiency, Symmetry, and Strong Mono-
tonicity is the Shapley value. The Shapley value has an el-
egant closed-form expression. It follows that the only way
of assigning individual degree of blameworthiness, given a
group blameworthiness function gb has the form:
db
c,E
N (j, ϕ) =∑
{Ag′⊆Ag: agj∈Ag
′}
(|Ag′|−1)!(|Ag|−|Ag′|)!
|Ag|! mb
c,E
N (j,Ag
′, ϕ).
We thus have a technique for assigning a degree of blame-
worthiness for an outcome to individuals in group settings.
However, this is relative to an epistemic state, a cost func-
tion, and a balance parameter. The question still remains
how these inputs should be chosen. As in HK, one approach
when assigning a degree of blameworthiness to an individ-
ual would be to take that individual’s epistemic state, cost
function, and balance parameter. But society may decide that
other choices are more reasonable.
Recall that in the last subsection we required that group
blame always be monotonic in the group, as if Ag ′′ could
coordinate in some manner then they should also be able to
do so as a subset of Ag ′. It is not hard to see (and we show
in the full paper) that this suffices to ensure that individual
blameworthiness will always be non-negative.
Note that in the single-agent setting, where the only
agent choosing an action is some particular ag1, if we as-
sume (as HK implicitly did) that an agent can completely
decide his or her own actions without the decision pro-
cess itself incurring costs beyond the costs of the action,
then the definition above agrees with the HK definition.
Consider ag1’s blameworthiness relative to ag1’s epistemic
state E1 = (Pr1,K1) and cost function c1. Note that
|Ag| = 1 and the only set Ag ′ containing ag1 is {ag1}.
So there is only one term to sum over in db
c1,E1
N (1, ϕ),
and in that term we have that
(|Ag|−1)!(|Ag|−|Ag|)!
|Ag|! =
1. Thus, dbc1,E1N (1, ϕ) = mb
c1,E1
N (1, {ag1}, ϕ). Because
ag1 ∈ {ag1}, mb
c1,E1
N (1, ϕ) = gb
c1
N ({ag1}, E1, ϕ) −
gbc1N (∅, E1, ϕ) = gb
c1
N ({ag1}, E1, ϕ). But now, because we
assumed that an agent can decide his or her own actions, the
alternatives that group {ag1} could have coordinatedwill be
precisely the set of actions available to ag1 at the costs they
would incur to ag1, so this is the HK definition of blame-
worthiness.
3.4 An illustrative example
The following example illustrates some features of these
definitions: Consider a scenario where a committee of 7 peo-
ple, ag1 through ag7, vote for whether or not to pass a bill.
If at least 4 agents vote yes, then the bill will pass. Every-
one agrees that it would be better for the bill to pass, but
there are external reasons (such as opinions of constituents)
that might result in agents benefiting from voting no as long
as the bill is passed. The committee votes and agents ag1
through ag5 all vote no, so the bill does not pass. How
blameworthy is each agent for this outcome?
We now consider the degree of blameworthiness of some
of the agents and show how the degree of blameworthiness
varies as a function of the agents’ beliefs:
• ag1 : ag1 believed that each of the 6 other agents started
with a 60% chance of voting yes. For any coalition of n
agents, ag1 also believed that for a cost of n × 100 each
agent’s probability of voting yes (including that of agents
not in the coalition) could be increased by n × 5% by
applying social pressure. In addition, if ag1 herself was
in the coalition, then for an additional cost of 2000 she
would have switched her vote to yes. Given these beliefs,
the degree of blameworthiness for the entire group is ≈
0.390, while ag1’s degree of blameworthiness is≈ 0.073.
• ag2 : ag2 held essentially the same beliefs as ag1, ex-
cept that the additional cost necessary for her to change
her vote for coalitions that she was in was 500 instead
of 2000. Given these beliefs, the degree of blameworthi-
ness of the entire group is ≈ 0.390, while ag2’s degree of
blameworthiness is ≈ 0.120.
ag2 holds essentially the same beliefs as ag1, but her cost
of changing her own vote to yes is lower than ag1’s. The
degree of blameworthiness of the entire group is the same
with respect to both ag1’s and ag2’s cost functions. In
the epistemic state that both agents share, with ag i’s cost
function (for i = 1, 2), the action that maximizes degree
of blameworthiness is the action where social pressure is
applied by all, but ag i does not change her view. Thus,
the cost of ag i changing her view does not play a role in
determining the degree of group blameworthiness. How-
ever, the blameworthiness of ag2 (according to ag2’s cost
function) is in fact greater than that of ag1 (according to
ag1’s cost function), as for some smaller groups the action
that maximizes blame consists of ag i changing her view,
so the lower cost for ag2 to do so will end up making her
more blameworthy. This is what we would expect; since
it is less costly for ag2 to vote yes, she intuitively ought to
be more blameworthy for not doing so.
• ag3 and ag4: ag3 held essentially the same beliefs as
ag1 except that she believed that social pressure would
be less effective. In particular, she believed that a coali-
tion of n agents applying social pressure for a cost of
n × 100 would result in an increase of only n × 3% in
each agent’s probability of voting yes. With these beliefs
and cost function, the degree of blameworthiness for the
entire group is ≈ 0.317, and ag3’s degree of blamewor-
thiness is ≈ 0.079.
ag4 held essentially the same beliefs as ag1 except that
she believed that it would cost n × 150 to get the so-
cial pressure applied by n agents to increase each agent’s
probability of voting yes by n× 5%. Given these beliefs,
the degree of blameworthiness for the entire group is ≈
0.361, and ag4’s degree of blameworthiness is ≈ 0.068.
ag3 and ag4 each share beliefs similar to ag1’s, but they
believe that social pressure will not be quite as effective,
either because it won’t have as much of an impact or be-
cause it will be more costly. As expected, in both of these
cases the degree of blameworthiness of the whole group
decreases, as there is not as much the group could have
been expected to do to ensure that the bill passed. It is
worth noting, however, that the blameworthiness of a par-
ticular agent may still go up, as it does here for ag3. The
reason for this is that, while the total group blame goes
down, if the group does not have effective alternatives to
ensure the desired outcome, then it may be even more im-
portant for that particular agent to take an action that can
significantly affect the outcome. There are several factors
that will affect whether (and to what extent) individual
blameworthiness increases or decreases, such as the dif-
ference in cost, difference in expected effect, and the bal-
ance parameterN .
• ag5: ag5 shared the same beliefs as ag1 with regard to
what actions can be taken and the costs of taking those
actions, but was more doubtful as to whether committee
members would vote yes without action being taken. In
particular, ag5 believed that each of the 6 other agents
started with a 40% chance of voting yes. She still believed
that a coalition of n agents could increase each agent’s
probability of voting yes by n×5% for a price of n×100,
and if she was in the coalition would have changed her
vote to yes for an additional cost of 2000. With these be-
liefs and cost function, the degree of blameworthiness for
the entire group is ≈ 0.560, and ag5’s degree of blame-
worthiness is ≈ 0.125.
The only difference between ag5 and ag1 was that ag5
believed there was a higher probability of the bill failing
in the first place. Relative to this belief, ag5 (as well as
the total group) is deemed to be more blameworthy, as
it is more critical that the group do something to ensure
the bill have a higher change of passing. To see how this
plays out formally, consider the case where all 7 agents
are involved in applying social pressure. Then the effect
this would have if the base probability was 60%would be
a ≈ 0.453 increase in the probability of the bill passing.
If, on the other hand, the base probability was only 40%,
then the social pressure would lead to a ≈ 0.651 increase
in the probability of a positive outcome. It is worth not-
ing that if the base probabilities of agents voting yes were
too low, then the blameworthiness would decrease, as the
probability of the social pressure being able to actually
effect a change would be low.
• ag6: Finally, ag6 held exactly the same beliefs and used
the same cost function as ag1, but unlike ag1, she voted
yes. In this case, the degree of blameworthiness for the
entire group is ≈ 0.157, and ag6’s degree of blamewor-
thiness is ≈ 0.022.
As we would expect, ag6 is deemed to be less blamewor-
thy than ag1. The total group blame is also lower relative
to this epistemic state, as the probability of the bill failing
to pass is lower (because there is one definitive yes vote)
and so group action was less important.
4 Related Work
Not surprisingly, there has been a tremendous amount of
work on notions of blameworthiness across a wide range
of fields. In this section, we survey some of the literature
most relevant to this work from computer science, philoso-
phy, and law.
Our definitions of blameworthiness are based directly on
those of HK. Chockler and Halpern (2004) also defined a no-
tion of blame that is related to but somewhat different from
blameworthiness; see (Halpern and Kleiman-Weiner 2018)
for a discussion.
Our use of Shapley value in defining how to apportion
group blame is similar to (and partly inspired by) the work
of Datta et al. (2015). They define a measure of the influ-
ence that each feature has on the classification of a dataset.
So, for instance, if one feature is gender, their measure is
intended to give a sense of how much influence gender had
on how the data was classified. They provide a set of desired
axioms for influence and show that there is a unique mea-
sure that satisfies these axioms, which roughly corresponds
to the probability that changing that feature would change
the classification. This seems to have natural relevance to
our setting if we consider each feature to be the action of an
agent and the classification to be the outcome. It is not suffi-
cient, however, as it is not clear how factors such as the cost
of an action (which is not relevant in the classification set-
ting) should be incorporated. The Datta et al. approach also
does not deal with the “group” aspects of group blame. It is
in a sense closer to the work of HK than to ours. For exam-
ple, in the Tragedy of the Commons, it would assign a low
degree of blameworthiness to individual agents. While the
group aspects are not relevant in the setting of classification
influence, in our setting they are critical.
Ferey and Dehez (2016) applied the Shapley value to
sequential-liability tort cases, cases where the amount of
damage each agent’s action brings about depends on the ac-
tions of earlier agents. The court must decide how restitution
of the damages should be divided among the agents in such
cases. Ferey and Dehez used reasoning similar to ours to
show that the Shapley value gives reasonable outcomes in
this context. They also showed that the outcomes seem to
align well with some prior case law and legal literature.
There has been much work in the philosophy literature
on moral responsibility, including its nature and the condi-
tions under which one ought to be held morally responsible.
Particular attention has been paid to the relation of moral re-
sponsibility to such issues as free will and agency. Eshleman
(2016) provides a good overview and further references.
There has also been significant discussion in the philo-
sophical literature on issues of collective moral responsibil-
ity: can it ever really exist, under what conditions would
it exist, can group moral responsibility be in turn divided
among the member agents, and how ought it be divided if
and when it can be? May and Hoffman (1992) provide an
excellent collection of essays exploring some of the major
ideas in this area. Cooper (1968) argues that collective moral
responsibility is not always divisible among agents. He con-
siders an analogy of a delicious stew made from various in-
gredients; we cannot say that any particular ingredient has
a specific degree of impact on the overall flavor; rather, it is
the precise way that the different flavors combined that led
to such a delicious stew. Similarly, he argues, there may be
instances where no particular agent can be ascribed blame
for the mis-actions of the group, but rather it emerges from
the collective as a whole. In these examples, it seems that
Cooper would reject the Efficiency axiom.
Van de Poel et al. (2015) focus on what they call the
problem of many hands (a term originally due to Thomp-
son (1980)): that is, the problem of allocating responsibil-
ity to individual agents who are members of a group that
is clearly responsible for an outcome. They formalize some
of their ideas using a variant of the logic CEDL (coalition
epistemic dynamic logic) (De Lima and Royakkers 2015).
Unfortunately, CEDL cannot directly capture counterfactu-
als, nor can it express quantitative notions like probability.
Thus, it cannot capture more quantitative tradeoffs between
choices that arise when defining degree of blameworthiness.
Finally, it is worth mentioning some of the factors that
come into play in legal notions of blameworthiness. Here
we focus on two in particular: joint and several liability and
normality. In tort cases where defendants are jointly and
severally liable, each defendant can be considered to be in-
dependently liable for the full extent of damages. Thus the
injured party can recover the full amount of damages from
any of the defendants; it is up to that defendant who ends up
paying damages to then attempt to recover some of the pay-
ment from other guilty parties. Thus, if two parties are guilty
for an outcome but one does not have the means to make
restitution or is inaccessible, the other party must make full
restitution. This may be viewed as suggesting that there are
cases where the law deems each agent who is sufficiently re-
sponsible as being fully blameworthy for the outcome rather
than just having a portion of the blameworthiness. However,
a more reasonable interpretation is that the law takes into
account considerations other than just degree of blamewor-
thiness when imposing penalties. Nevertheless, considera-
tions of blameworthiness are likely to come into play when
the defendant who is compelled to pay attempts to recover
some damages from the other defendants. When joint and
several liability should be applied is a complicated matter in
the legal literature (see, e.g., (Prosser 1936)).
Another notion at play in legal considerations of blame-
worthiness is the legal norm. The only considerations we
have built into our definitions are expected affect on the out-
come and the cost of actions. In the law, however, the extent
to which an agent is judged to have deviated from the legal
norm may play a role in judgments of blameworthiness for
outcomes that were brought about by multiple individuals
(American Law Institute 2000). In future work we hope to
further explore formalizations of some of the notions at play
in legal ascription of blameworthiness. Work done on com-
bining notions of normality with causality (Halpern 2016;
Halpern and Hitchcock 2015) may prove relevant in dealing
with issues like legal norms.
5 Conclusion
We have provided a way to ascribe blameworthiness to
groups of agents that generalizes the HK definition. We then
showed how, given ascriptions of group blameworthiness,
the Shapley value can be used to ascribe blameworthiness to
individual agents. These two contributions are separable; if
an alternative definition of group blameworthiness is used,
the Shapley value could still be used to ascribe blamewor-
thiness to individual agents.
In considering these issues carefully, one obvious ques-
tion is whether we view our definitions as descriptive or pre-
scriptive. The answer is “both”. We plan to do experiments
to see if the perceived difficulty of coordination really does
affect how people ascribe group blameworthiness, and to see
whether an agent’s potential marginal contribution to an ac-
count affects his ascribed degree of blameworthiness. To the
extent that we can view legal penalties as proxies for degree
of blameworthiness, we can also examine the legal literature
to see how these issues affected outcomes in legal cases (al-
though, as we observed earlier, there is clearly more to how
penalties are apportioned in legal cases than just blamewor-
thiness). Whether or not our definitions exactly match how
people seem to ascribe blameworthiness, we might still ask
whether these definitions might be useful as guides for as-
cribing blameworthiness in situations involving self-driving
cars (or a combination of self-driving cars and humans).
Formalizing notions of moral responsibility will be crit-
ical for the eventual goal of designing autonomous agents
that behave in a moral manner. We believe that blamewor-
thiness as we have considered it in this work is one im-
portant component of moral responsibility, though not the
whole story. In future work we hope to continue exploring
how these notions can be formalized and applied to a wide
variety of settings, especially legal settings; we hope that
others will join us in considering these problems.
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